Programme Overview

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The online EO Learning Programme on ‘African Conflict and Politics’ will provide programme participants with an understanding of the symbiotic relationship between conflict and politics as well as offer insight and understanding on how African governments can improve security, mitigate armed challengers and threats, and create a climate in which improved and sustainable economic development and governance can take place.

As the decolonisation of Africa gathered momentum, so too did armed anti-government movements and organisations make their appearances, each intent on exerting influence, seizing control, taking power and enforcing their respective ideologies.

With the advent of the Cold War, Africa became the conflict zone for numerous proxy wars as both the West and the East (in particular the Soviet-bloc) tried to expand their influence, interests and control over the continent. Africa was plunged into conflict and perceived as a ‘conflict continent’ where political ideologies, influence and economic interests contested one another through the projection of power or the use of armed force and other violent acts.

As newly discovered resources made their appearances in Africa, along with good harbours, fertile grounds, and cheap labour, geopolitical interests in Africa escalated. These factors, along with growing interests and power blocs, ignited the race for control over Africa and, in particular, its resources.

In addition, frustrated with their governments, and trapped between their ideals and the artificial borders of countries, along with views of marginalisation, xenophobia, poverty, religion, and so forth, disgruntled people and groups took armed action against their governments. The uprisings were frequently bloody and horrific and did not always lead to regime change. They did, however, result in countless deaths, damaged infrastructure, the erosion of economies, the weakening of states, large internally displaced populations (IDPs), investor concerns, ungoverned spaces, and so forth.

Following the end of the Cold War, a disproportionately large number of armed conflicts have occurred in Africa. It is estimated that 630 state-based and non-state based armed conflicts have occurred on the continent between 1990 and 2015. None have been as horrific and devastating—or received as much publicity—as the genocide in Rwanda. However, others such as the decades old, ongoing dispute between Morocco and Western Sahara, and the status of Somaliland go largely unnoticed.

Subsequent to the NATO-led regime change in Libya, the proliferation of arms from Libya’s arms depots equipped numerous other regional anti-government factions. Groups such as Boko Haram, and ISWAP, along with other religious-driven organisations have subsequently made their presence felt in West Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic have seen the emergence of transnational armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) and Seleka, respectively.

Furthermore, it was the collapse of the Gaddafi regime that had a direct connection with and impact on the re-emergence of the Malian insurgency resultant from an influx of weapons and fighters from Libya to Mali. (This constitutes a good example of how conflicts can spill across borders and be interconnected).

More recently, we have witnessed the unfolding of the conflict in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique and the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Generally, every conflict has been characterised by:

Poor or weak national strategies and associated policies directed by questionable leadership;
The failure of governments to be informed by robust, non-partisan intelligence services that exploit multiple assets, sources, and resources. This has resulted in governments being ill-prepared/unprepared for actions aimed at eroding their legitimacy and/or territory, or effecting regime change;
The lack of government reach resulting in an inability to exercise good governance across their territories;
The growing geopolitical importance of Africa and its natural resources, along with international interventions;
The challenges faced by the armed forces in dealing with the conflicts and wars. This is largely due to the fact that many African armies are clones of their erstwhile colonial masters or their Cold War allies. These structures and doctrines have proven to be ill-suited to Africa;
Territorial and grazing rights disputes;
A growing discontent by citizens who feel marginalised by their governments and are therefore driven to unseat and replace it with one of their own.

There has also been a very predictable pattern of how conflicts or wars start:

Either resources are discovered, or a government does not comply with international expectations;
A problem is created by the challengers to a government’s authority, legitimacy, or territoriality;
The problem is internationalised, and driven through mainstream and social media outlets and platforms;
Foreign or regional clandestine or covert aid is given to the challengers;
The challengers resort to armed action and propaganda thereby escalating the conflict;
The attempts at regime change intensify.

The end result has always been characterised by an increasingly fragile government; international condemnation and outrage; destroyed economies and infrastructure; a lack of faith in the security forces; large IDPs; collapse of health institutions and an escalation in diseases; unemployment and poverty, and so forth. These calamities have also opened doors to misspent monies, corruption, and greed, placing Africa well below the average of ‘low human development’.

Exacerbating the overall security problems in Africa has been the politicisation and use and abuse by governments of their armed forces.

The questions can therefore be asked:

Why did things go wrong in Africa?
Will Africa ever change?

(It is important that programme participants carefully study and understand the presented modules, module contents along with their accompanying footnotes to gain an appreciation of the programme and its contents. The footnotes—presented as hyperlinks—provide a comprehensive and deeper understanding of the concepts, knowledge and theory necessary to better grasp some of the macro factors that have resulted in conflict and war on the African continent).

To answer these questions requires an understanding of successful state building and African political thought and its impact on people and states.

Regardless, African governments will always be faced with challengers who plan and focus their actions on eroding the legitimacy of states, usurping power, seizing resources, exerting power, and implementing ideologies and trajectories of their own.

If African states are to redirect their trajectories, and that of the continent, it will require decisive, focussed, and strong political and security force will, and driven by focussed political and security (military) leadership. This will necessitate a serious reassessment of the National Strategies and the subsequent National Security Strategies of countries.

To support a National Strategy, the armed forces must be non-partisan and politically astute, and develop and implement a National Military/Defence Strategy to support the National Strategy. This strategy is part of a troika (National Intelligence Strategy, National Law Enforcement Strategy, and the National Military/Defence Strategy), and is subservient to the National Strategy. Its aim is to provide direction and guidance to the armed forces to defend and protect the integrity of the state, its territoriality, the constitution, and the citizens against domestic, regional, and foreign threats. To understand the generally acknowledged mandate of the armed forces, read footnote 14 hereunder.

As the instructions for the armed forces to deploy both strategically and operationally and fulfil their mandates emanate from the government, it implies that the armed forces remain subservient to the political machinery and its direction at all times. However, the apparent politicisation of the armed forces has eroded their efficacy along with the accepted norm that the armed forces must be non-partisan and politically astute.

Once a threat has been identified and confirmed, the armed forces are instructed to conduct a specific type of military operation to neutralise it. Its actions will subsequently be guided and directed by the National Strategy, along with the National Military/Defence Strategy and its associated policies. All strategies must be intelligence-driven to reduce uncertainties.

The actions of the armed forces unfold at three distinct yet interrelated levels: the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level.

Although there are different ways in which the armed forces can deploy, their deployment is usually as follows:

At the Strategic Level:

At this level, options are investigated, and decisions made on how, where, and when to deploy the armed forces. These intelligence-driven processes are guided and directed by the National Strategy and the National Military/Defence Strategy, and may manifest as a military campaign strategy;
The Area of Operations (where the combat operations will take place), the Area of Influence (an area adjacent to the AO that can influence combat operations) and the Area of Interest (the area beyond the Area of Influence that can impact on the AO) are assessed along with their influences (geopolitical, economic, and other) on the campaign.

At the Operational Level:

At this level, the implementation and unpacking of the campaign strategy—known as the operational design and its associated course(s) of action are determined;
Campaign objectives are identified, along with options on how to achieve the objectives while mitigating military and civilian causalities and other collateral damage;
Through the operational design and associated courses of action, missions, tasks, and resources are determined and allocated to conduct combat operations to attain the campaign objectives;
The requisite forces to partake in the campaign are identified, integrated, and doctrine confirmed. If necessary, additional training is given;

At the Tactical Level:

The armed forces engage in actions to attack and secure the campaign objectives while destroying and/or neutralising the threat(s);
The armed forces exploit horisontal and vertical manoeuvre assets, and maximise the effects of direct and indirect fires and manoeuvres;
Campaign objectives are taken and exploited, and the threat(s) driven to capitulate;
Power is consolidated;
Government control is re-exerted in the area(s) where the campaign took place.

Once operations have been successfully concluded, state buildingmust commence. The aim of state building is to redirect fragile areas/states towards resilient areas/states.

African Conflict and Politics – Module 1

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